They're not just baffled

Russians generals, the Moscow Times reports are baffled by the quick Allied advance into Baghdad. I first saw this at Shoutin' Across the Pacific, and later it also appeared at The Command Post, again focusing on the bafflement of Russian generals. But that's not the most important information in that story. Here's a much more significant excerpt:

Last week it was disclosed that two retired three-star generals -- Vladislav Achalov (a former paratrooper and specialist in urban warfare) and Igor Maltsev (a specialist in air defense) -- visited Baghdad recently and were awarded medals by Hussein. The awards were handed out by Iraqi Defense Minister Sultan Khashim Akhmed.

It was reported that the retired generals helped Hussein prepare a war plan to defeat the Americans. Achalov confirmed he was in Baghdad just before the war and received medals from Hussein for services rendered. He also told journalists that the defense of Baghdad was well organized, U.S. tanks would be burned if they enter the city and U.S. infantry would be slaughtered. According to Achalov, the only way the allies could ever take Baghdad and other Iraqi cities was to raze them to the ground by carpet bombing.

In other words, retired Russian generals have been actively helping our enemy. From the Russian government's perspective, this offers "plausible deniability" while still remaining chummy with Saddam. In a system that's as autocratic as today's Russia, it'd be surprising if the Putin government wasn't involved in this visit. If Putin had played his cards better, he could have come out the winner in the long-term (and I thought he would). Siding with Saddam should have consequences, and there's a big juicy target waiting: Lukoil, the Russian oil company. It had signed a multi-billion dollar contract with Saddam for the development of the West Qurna oilfield. It's already trying to stake its claim to that field even after the regime change, threatening to sue in international courts. I have no idea how strong their position is from a legal point of view, but pragmatically speaking they don't stand a chance. Play with dictators and suffer the consequences.

Shifting alliances

I commented yesterday on the Franco-German axis that is now undermining NATO. As I said, this is happening a lot faster than I had expected, but the decline in NATO's relevance does not come as a big surprise to me. It's part of a big realignment in the post WWII institutions that is taking place. I expected these processes of transformation or decomposition to take a lot longer. But the UN, EU, IMF, World Bank and NATO are changing and in some cases, they're slowly sliding into irrelevance. The irony in NATO's case is that it is losing its relevance just as it had admitted a new batch of member countries who most desired the benefits of NATO membership.

Aside from the geopolitical reasons of the Franco-German Axis for torpedoing NATO, there are some other factors at work too. The threat we now face is more diffuse. The Soviet missiles, tanks and fighter aircraft were there right across the West German border. That was pretty hard to ignore, even those the pacifist left of Western Europe did its best to try to pretend they weren't there. Even though the French were playing their spoiler game against American interests, their self-interest in maintaining an American security umbrella was strong even never to overplay their hand. They knew that without US protection, their own country would be vulnerable. The force de frappe was not a sufficient nuclear deterrent. Since the fall of communism and the rise of islamofascism as the prime threat to our western way of life, the threat has become more diffuse. There are no huge armies of tanks, aircraft, ships or missiles lined up somewhere. Instead, we have a disparate network of shady regimes in a loose alliance arrayed against us. The threat is real all the same, but it's easier now to fool yourself into thinking it's not there.

This is what emboldens the French in their new pursuit of a more vigorous anti-American foreign policy. The German government has arrived at its current position as a result of the pacifist, anti-American past of its leading figures. They were the ones who in the face of the Soviet threat argued for unilateral disarmament; it's not a surprise that in the face of a new threat they again choose to bury their heads in the sand. It is surprising that both Germany and France seem willing to sacrifice NATO so quickly in order to pursue their dream of a foreign policy identity for the EU. But building an identity based on a negative definition (i.e. anti-US in this case) is never going to be enough.

The clear threat of the Soviets did manage to keep NATO coherent during the cold war. The threat of obliteration that the Soviets posed to the free West focused otherwise muddled minds wonderfully. Now that it is gone and replaced with a more diffuse threat, the muddle wins once again. The desire to take down America a notch or two is apparently too great to resist. It's also doomed to failure, because by their very actions, the Franco-German Axis is undermining whatever is left of their so beloved multilateral institutions, such as NATO and the UN. It boils down to the fundamental reality gap that exists in Berlin and Paris: they don't see the threat, or don't want to see it. Once you admit the threat is there, the anti-American spoiling tactics become too dangerous.

As I mentioned yesterday, one of the big winners out of all this might be Russia. It depends on where Putin will come down in the final question on Iraq. Russia is a country that has recently lost an empire, and is still hurting from that loss. Its nuclear arsenal gives it an an importance far exceeding its economic prowess, and it's the one thing that bestows any respectability on the Russian government at this point. Putin has been making good use of this lopsided position that Russia enjoys, and apparent he has a good relationship with Bush. Putin has also shown far more strategic insight than Schröder or Chirac and seems to understand the strengths and weaknesses of his position better. Pulling Russia firmly into the orbit of the West would be in both the US and the Russian interest, and in the post 9/11 world it seems more likely than ever.

Putin could secure a long-term strategic advantage if he chooses the side of the US now. The Bush Administration has been edging towards a more sympathetic position where it comes to supporting Russia. Recent moves to classify certain Chechen organizations as terrorists is one such step; by acknowledging the link between Al-Qaeda and the Chechens the United States is allying itself with the Russians. A reciprocal gesture becomes more likely. Right now, Putin still has not committed himself and is steering a careful course. He was never expected to become a full-blown supporter of the US line on Iraq, so his reticence has not been a surprise nor has it been seen as a betrayal. But he's been careful not to burn any bridges with Washington, and the rapprochement on the issue of terrorism is bringing Putin closer to Bush. All that Putin needs in order to support the US line on Iraq is a committment from the US that any post-Saddam Iraq would be willing to honor the large debts that the current Iraq owes to the Russians. While the French and the Germans are busily alienating themselves from Washington, Russia might come out of this looking pretty good in Washington.

The long-term strategic benefits would be enormous. America's focus is already shifting away from Paris and Berlin towards economically more dynamic regions such as China or to friendlier countries such as Poland. Russia could have an influence far above its economic importance in the next years if Putin plays his cards right and maintains his friendship with Bush. The alternative for Putin is to throw his weight behind the Franco-German Axis in the hopes of derailing American power in short term. He's probably realist enough to realize that that's an unlikely outcome. So I think he's going to end up being much more supportive of the US position than his latest comments indicate.

I still don't trust the Russians though. Any such moves would be done out of pure-self interest. That's fine as far as it goes, but neither Putin nor Russia have yet recovered emotionally from the loss of empire, and the revanchist emotion runs deep and strong. Still, I am hopeful that such short-term cooperation will lay the foundation for a more constructive course for Russian policy in the medium and longer term.

The project of Democracy

Building a functioning, self-sustaining democracy is hard. It requires more than just elections. The institutions, the constitution, the rule of law all play a part. When we say "democracy," it is shorthand for much more than elections. But ultimately, none of this matters if the idea and the ideal of democracy is not understood and cherised by the population. If the people don't think democracy is a good thing and worth defending, it will vanish. Some outward signs of democracy (usually elections) may remain, like the facade of a building otherwise gutted by flame. What democracy needs is deep support. It has to be an inextricable part of life, that the mere thought of not having does not even arise. Deep support also leads to the willingness to defend democracy when it comes under attack.

Building deep support is something that requires time. Lots of time. Many generations. Peoples and cultures have their own transgenerational memories. Those cultures that have no memory of democracy will find it much harder to build a functioning, modern, liberal democracy. In the case of Russia, there is no such memory. The country never has had anything resembling a modern liberal system of government, and the deep memories of the culture reflect the totalitarian rule of the czars and the communists. The idea of democracy lives a marginalized life. The elections do exist, but deep support is missing.

The cause of this lengthy introduction is this article in the German newspaper Handelblatt. I have not seen a compilation like this in the English press, so here are some highlights. The headline is "Enough of this democracy," and the article is a summary of comments made in Russia since the storming of the theater. A high-ranking officer of the Alpha commando unit that stormed the theater is quoted as saying "Enough of this democracy and human rights." Other comments came in a similar vein. Writing in the newspaper Kommersant, Boris Volkhonsky said, "Laden with the backpack of 20th century liberal values one cannot fight terrorism." Leonid Radsikhivsky described as "very liberal" demanded the introduction of a "hard police state." As in 1941 with the German invasion, it is the survival of the country that is at stake. A "Kremlin politicologist" by the name of Sergey Markov opines: "We can be proud of Russia again." He said that the Russian had feared a storming of the theater only because they were not sure that the secrer services could carry it out competently. "This is the rebirth of our homeland."

Read these comments again and imagine them in a western democracy. How unthinkable are they? The overwhelming torrent of commentary after September 11th was a worry about the erosion of civil liberties in the wake of the attack, not an active call for their erosion. Despite the shrillest auguries from the doomsayers and Bush-bashers, America remains a free country. It remains free because the concepts of the Bill of Rights and the Constitution are an inseparable part of American life. The situation is not perfect, and there is much room for improvement, but the fundamental disposition of the American republic remains intact.

I wrote a few days ago about Russia's relationship with the west. It is a country that shares a lot of cultural heritage with the west, although it is lacking that heritage in the political field. It should be relatively easy to merge Russia into the western mainstream with so much in common, yet these reactions prove how hard it is. And how much harder is it going to be in Iraq? The Japanese model has been put forward as an example of a successful rebuilding and remodeling of a pathological society. From its imperialist pre-war state to the post-war democracy, Japan is a success. But has the idea of democracy really taken root in Japan? The real power lies with unelected bureaucrats and the political elite. Elections are almost secondary, as the LDP has to screw up really badly to lose. In fact, it has screwed up really badly as it has steered the country to a decade of economic decline, but even so it remains by far the largest party. More important than the number of seats the LDP gets in the Diet is the balance of power among the LDP's factions. And the Japanese economy is pre-capitalist with a few pockets of corporate excellence in a sea of rotting zombies. But the Japan model was successful to the extent that the system in principle should be able to heal itself and the woes afflicting the country. And it has been successful in neutralizing the threat from Japan.

Reform-minded politicians in repressive regimes see the need for more popular support and one solution is to experiment with democracy. Or perhaps more precisely, elections. By giving the people a say in elections they hope to defuse anger and resentment as well as build support for their rule. It's a good first step, but again it must come with the other elements of the Democracy Package. Building an understanding of and appreciation for liberal democratic virtues is an integral part of this. So is having a free capitalist economy.

It did not get much play in the Blogosphere, but elections have been held in Bahrain, and the Islamist candidates won most of the seats. Gulf News puts of a brave face on it, by claiming that secular candidates did better this time around than in municipal elections held earlier, when they did not win any seats at all. The article goes on:

"Despite this improvement, nonetheless, they have to admit they lost and lost big to the religious movement."

The main reason, he says, is the past 30 years in which the arena has been occupied exclusively by the Islamists. "These movements have been closer to the people; they have the mosques, the charities and ability to influence people with all their talk of the Holy Quran."

The liberals, meanwhile, have been "absent" since they clashed with the government in the mid-1970s over the constitutional rights after the National Assembly was dissolved in 1975.

"They isolated themselves. They were alienated and people could no longer understand what they were talking about because younger generations have been influenced by the rise of Islamism with the Iranian revolution and other religious movements," he explained.

Is it possible for an Arab country to reform its political system from authoritarian rule to a democracy? The lure of the glory of the past is great. By promising a return to old-fashioned Islamic virtues, the religious parties play on an ancient cultural meme in the Arab world. Arab culture achieved its greatest glory when it was supposedly pure and untainted. All later misfortune is due to straying from the true path of Islam. It is a simple message with great emotive power and attraction. After all, it offers a solution without having to import any ideas from the infidel West.

The reason we were welcomed in Afghanistan is because the logical extreme of this line of thought had triumphed there. The Taliban imposed the strictest Islamic regime in history. It was not very popular. Likewise in Iran the erstwhile attractions of the Islamic revolution have long since dissolved in the caustic reality of everyday life. The murmurs of revolution are growing stronger in Persia now.

Do the people really have to suffer the reality of theocratic thuggery before they reject Islamofascism? Even in Saudi Arabia, which is already close to a theocracy, the cause of an even more extreme form of Islamism is finding converts. It is going to be a long and difficult task to establish any understanding or support for liberal democracy in these countries. As the Gulf News articles says, there is precious little internal intellectual support for it.

Do people want to be free? Do people want to be prosperous? I would answer yes to both questions. The second will find universal acclaim, the first won't. The basis for totalitarian ideology is exactly the denying of freedom to the people. Whether it be the call for a police state in Russia, or for a strict version of Sharia in the Arab world, the instincts for state-imposed restrictions of freedom run deep in countries where there is no memory of democracy. But even in the supposedly free-wheeling Netherlands the people are willing to trade freedom for apparent security.

It's not going to be easy at all.

UPDATE: Related commentary can be found at OxBlog and Sgt. Stryker.

Putin's long-term strategy

In a comment posted below and reiterated at his own blog, Ron Campbell asks what the Russians hope to get out of it. Damned if I know. That of course won't stop me from speculating. This is a blog, after all.

Putin's early career in the Soviet Union was as an officer in the KGB, working in the foreign intelligence arm. For several years he was stationed in East Germany, and he speaks German well. This has allowed him to cultivate his relationship with Germany under Schröder. Putin's style in Russia is hard and uncompromising. The second Chechen war was started after a series bomb explosions in Moscow which ripped apart several apartment buildings, leading to hundreds of dead. This wave of terrorism was blamed on the Chechen, and used as a pretext for launching the second Chechen war. However, no evidence of this was ever produced of this supposed link, and there have been persistent allegations that it was the Russian secret service that was responsible, as documented on this Danish site. Sound monstrous? The KGB was monstrous. The Soviet Union was monstrous. And Putin spent most of his career in the Soviet Union in the KGB, whose business it was to keep the communist dictatorship in power. In the grand scheme of things, the Soviet-era mentality is perfectly capable of blowing up a few hundred of its own people in order to pursue a larger goal. The larger goal is to re-establish Russia as a first-rate power. The shock of not being taken seriously on the world stage after losing its empire is a deep psychological wound in the Russian psyche.

I read once an editorial in the Wall Street Journal (can't find it online) that Putin has a copy of Atlas Shrugged on his bookshelf. If he has read the book, its message has not taken hold. The transformation necessary from KGB apparatchik to someone who would truly understand and promote liberal democracy is enormous, and I don't think Putin is capable of it. He will remain, at heart, someone for whom the state is an end in itself, not something that exists to protect its' citizens rights.

As I mentioned in my previous post, there is an opportunity to entice Russia back into the mainstream of Western civilization. The obvious road to that goal is to establish a capitalist economy in Russia. But taking this tack is mistaking Russia's ultimate goal: having a prosperous economy is just a step on the way of re-establishing Russian national greatness and imperialism. That is the way Putin is likely to see it at the moment. The hope is that once Russians do get the benefits of increased prosperity, the wounds of losing the empire will start to heal. But that will take a long time. For several generations the Russian people have been bombarded with propaganda demonizing the West, and especially the US. Even in eastern Germany, which has benefited enormously from capitalism and America's role in Europe, the generations-long brainwashing has left a strong undercurrent of anti-American feeling.

So I think Putin's current strategy has to be seen in the light of the long-term goal of putting Russia back on the map of Great Powers. He certainly realizes that he can make common cause with the US in the war against the Islamofascist enemy. How freely he will give his cooperation to the US in this depends on how great he thinks the danger to Russia is. Bush has rightly determined that eradicating the Islamofascists and the regimes that support them (like Iraq) is necessary. Putin has to ask himself whether Russia will be an ongoing target in the war, or whether it will be secondary. If he thinks the danger to Russia is containable by the use of force in Chechnya and that Iraq is peripheral to this, he will try to play the US for his support.

This is something I have never understood about shady opportunistic regimes, such as those in Russia, China and France. Why do they think that there is no danger to them from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? They're happy to deal with and protect rogue states all over the world. But North Korean and Iraqi missiles (if further developed) could strike just as easily in China, Russia and France. It is a peculiar myopia that these regimes display. For all their criticism of the US for fighting an "oil war," it these regimes who have the dollar signs in their eyes, and are willing to sell their souls to any third-world tyrant who throws them some baubles.

So what does Putin think he can get out of this? The most optimistic scenario is that he will see this as the opening bid in a long term rapprochement between Russia and the US. Fighting a war on the same side is always a good start. Then again, we also fought with the Soviets against the Nazis, so it's not necessarily the start of a beautiful friendship. If we can show Putin that Russia and he himself will benefit by cooperating with the US, he will probably do so. On the other hand, the resentment of America's victory in the Cold War and Russian dreams of a new empire might lead Russia to try to play it too cute: withhold full support in the war and trying to maneuver for position on the world stage as a result, for instance by playing Saddam's protector at the UN. This would be extremely short sighted and it's a losing strategy, but it could cause a whole lot of problems in the short term.

In the end, the Russian economy depends on oil. A $1 move in the price of oil leads to a billion dollar swing Russia's state finances. From that perspective, it is in Russia's interest to keep oil prices as high as possible by not having a resolution of threat of war in the Middle East. Again, a short-sighted strategy that will not achieve anything in the long term, while losing credibility and good will in the US. But Russia is a huge country rich in mineral resources other than oil, and should be able to build a more balanced economy. The short-term pain of lower oil prices after the liberation of Iraq is bearable for the Russian economy, but it will make Putin's life more complicated. Russia's economy needs to be weaned off its petrodollar dripfeed; it's a theme I have been returning to again and again. A sound economy is vital.

Putin's long-term goal is resuscitating the Russian empire. But our and his short-term goals coincide sufficiently to start building a real partnership that can be used to defuse the imperial revanchism in the longer term, leading to a situation in which Russia becomes a confident modern state that no longer feels the pain of its amputated phantom limbs.

UPDATE: Another thing I wanted to mention (answering Ron's question, which is how I started off on this) is that in concrete terms what Putin may be looking for from the US is a free hand in dealing with Russia's "near abroad" in the Caucasus. Allowing Russia to reassert its imperialist aspirations in the region (such as their troop deployments in Georgia) would be a mistake, because it's going to leave us with a much bigger mess to clean up later. Morally it would also be a deeply flawed move, even on the chessboard of realpolitik. We owe it to the recently liberated peoples of the region to prevent a new Russian dominion.

Russia and the terrorist attack in Moscow

67 dead. That's the sad toll of the terrorist attack on Moscow. It could have been much, much worse, and I was expecting much, much worse. The Russian authorities have handled this probably as well as they could have given the circumstances. With over 800 hostages in total, the total death toll could have been calamitous, in scale almost approaching the mass murder of September 11th. It did not come as a surprise to hear that the terrorists were yet again Islamofascists. It should begin to dawn on even the slower-witted that there is a pattern here.

The terrorists claimed to be acting on behalf of the Chechen government in exile which opposes Russian rule in the country. I don't think they have done themselves any favors. Their wider cause of Jihad against the infidels has also been damaged, for this will only push Russia and the US closer together in the war against the Islamofascists. After the attack on the French tanker in Yemen, the mass murder in Bali and now the attack in Moscow, all that remains for the terrorists is to attack German interests somewhere to complete their tour of major countries opposing America.

The sad thing is that the Chechens did not start off as Islamofascists. The breakup of the Soviet Union left Russia shell-shocked about its sudden loss of empire, first in central and eastern Europe, then closer to home. Even their Slavic brethren in Ukraine and Byelarus preferred to become independent. The shock of losing an empire can perturb the national psyche for a long time. The British only recently managed to find a more confident international identity after the wilderness years of the post-war era. And that was in large part due to the Thatcherite remaking of Britain and the economic dynamism she managed to bring back.

A few years after the liberation of the captive nations of the Soviet Union, other parts of the Russian empire were beginning to stir and assert themselves, including the Chechens. Moscow's response was brutal and disproportionate, sending in the troops to quash the Chechen's aspirations for independence. The Chechen won the first war, inflicting a humiliating defeat on the Russian forces. And I definitely cheered for them. But the West's political leadership really dropped the ball here. In true Clintonesque rudderlessness, the West allowed the Russians do as they pleased. Somewhere in the State Department, buried deep in the bowels of the buildings, there is a room of worship where the Mandarins come to burn incense every day at the Altar of Stability. I suggest we rename the State Department to the Status Quo Department. Then the opinions of the Secretary of Status Quo would make much more sense. "Sure, terrorists are being trained in Remotistan, but taking action would endanger the stability of the region. We at Status Quo would have to redraw all our maps again. Do you have any idea how much that costs?"

We in the West definitely let the Chechens down shamefully in that conflict and in the second Chechen war, in which the Russians avenged their earlier defeat. Had we supported them, we might now have (after a period of instability) an independent Chechen republic along the lines of Tadjikistan or Azerbaijan. These certainly aren't shining examples of enlightened liberal thought or practice, but they are not overly infested by Islamofascism. And their governments tend to value good relations with the US.

But that's all water under the bridge. The reality now is that a new nest of Islamofascism is taking root in Chechenya. Not all independence seeking Chechens are part of this, but as we have seen in Moscow, there are plenty of them, and they seem to be allied to the Chechen government in exile. Given that they have chosen the side of the greatest threat to modern liberal society, I have absolutely no sympathy for them. Any vestigial sympathy I may have had has been washed away by the terror attack in Moscow. And we have to deal with the situation as it is now, not as it might have been. Eradicating the threat has to be priority number one, and that unfortunately means more military action in Chechenya, and even more unfortunately, it's going to be done in a very Russian way. We will get to observe the difference between American military action and Russian. Expect little regard for minimizing civilian casuaties. Expect maximum brutality. Also expect no European sophisticates to protest loudly. After all, it's not America they'd be protesting against.

There are two objectives: forcible elimination of the Islamofascists in Chechenya and trying to find some compromise with the other factions in the country. Given the way objective number one is going to be tackled, number two is going to be very hard, if not impossible to achieve. I hope Putin has enough tactical sense to see this, but I am not very hopeful.

The future of the relationship between Russia and the West is still up for grabs. Actually, the question is whether Russia is actually already part of Western Civilization., or has a sufficiently similar background to the West in order to become part of it. This was addressed recently at Regions of Mind. Russia has a lot in common with the civilization of Western Europe. The cultural links were very strong before the long night of communism. Russian works are a staple in Western music and literature. Politically, Czarist Russia was definitely backward compared to the more enlightened parts of the Western world like Britain and the United States. Then again, other great monarchies of Europe were backward too. But even communism was a western phenomenon, imported from the industrializing west and foisted upon the hapless Russian population. During the period of totalitarian tyrrany in Russia, the rulers did try to maintain an outward veneer of democratic (read Western) legitimacy. Fake elections, "People's Republics," the great proletariat. Sot the strains of Western culture have deep roots in Russia, but they have been so undernourished, so deeply buried that it is going to take considerable time to turn these roots into a solid tree.

It is our interest to coax Russia into the mainstream of Western civilization. The current war against the Islamofascists is a good starting point for this, but the danger is that Russia's authoritarian and imperialist tendencies will prove stronger than its will to reform. Simply put, I don't trust them one bit. It's going to be a long, tough process, but the price of failure will be high. The reward of success would be immense.